1. Introduction {#sec0005}
===============

The idea of implementing a transaction tax on foreign exchange (FX) markets was first circulated by James Tobin in the early 1970s as a reaction to the high volatility in FX markets after the fall of the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates ([@bib0145]). He argued that the tremendous increase in trading volume since then had mainly been due to speculative behavior.[1](#fn0005){ref-type="fn"} Tobin assumes two archetypes of traders on financial markets: stabilizing long-term investors who base their trades on fundamentals, and short-term speculators who try to detect time trends in prices. Hence, a small transaction tax would mainly harm the frequently trading speculators who would either leave the market or at least markedly reduce their trading volume. Consequently, this would lead to a decrease in volatility and to an increase in market efficiency, while potential tax revenues are a "side effect" for Tobin.[2](#fn0130){ref-type="fn"} The attitude on the last point has changed in the past few years, at least among politicians, as during the financial crisis 2007--2009 the idea of a Tobin tax has become very popular among them. The tax seems to target "evil speculators" and promises substantial tax revenues which do not have to be paid (directly) by the "normal" tax payer/voter.

Scientific research on the impact of a Tobin tax has started mainly in the 1990s with studies on the more general issue of how transaction taxes affect financial markets.[3](#fn0015){ref-type="fn"} There is broad consensus in the literature on some "trivial" issues such as negative effects of a Tobin tax on trading volume and market shares of taxed markets (compared to untaxed markets, i.e. tax havens).[4](#fn0020){ref-type="fn"}

While the direction of the volume effects seems to be clear, other issues, especially the impact of a Tobin tax on volatility and on market efficiency, are still hotly debated, with strong academic backers for both sides. Parts of the controversy regarding volatility are likely due to different methodological approaches and different model assumptions: the main body of literature supporting the hypothesis of Tobin relies on agent-based models,[5](#fn0025){ref-type="fn"} while studies opposing the hypothesis of Tobin are mainly empirical, but suffer from the problem that they can only infer the impact of transaction taxes indirectly, since a Tobin tax has not yet been implemented.[6](#fn0030){ref-type="fn"}

One common feature of all the papers mentioned so far is that the market microstructure has been ignored. This paper is an attempt to close this research gap. Currently, global trading in foreign exchange is dominated by two market microstructures: part of global volume is handled by exchanges where market makers ensure permanent liquidity provision.[7](#fn0035){ref-type="fn"} An even larger share of global volume is traded OTC (over-the-counter) between individual parties without market makers.[8](#fn0040){ref-type="fn"} The only paper to directly address the important market microstructure issues with respect to a Tobin tax is by [@bib0100]. They use an agent-based model with the chartist/fundamentalist approach and explore the effect of a Tobin tax in different market microstructures, namely dealership and double-auction markets. They report that liquidity decreases in reaction to the imposition of a Tobin tax in a double-auction market and thus a given market order has a stronger price impact. As a consequence the imposition of a Tobin tax does not decrease price volatility, since the stabilizing effect of a reduction in speculative orders and the destabilizing effect of an increased price impact of orders due to lowered liquidity offset each other. By implementing a dealership-market with artificial market makers providing constant liquidity provision, they find that the introduction of a Tobin tax reduces volatility in dealership markets as speculation is reduced. Thus, a Tobin tax has different effects, depending on the market microstructure.[9](#fn0045){ref-type="fn"}

Our paper can be understood as a cross-test of agent-based models and laboratory experiments, as we base our research question on and compare our results to [@bib0100]. We implement two important alterations to their setup by (i) conducting laboratory markets with real humans interacting, and by (ii) implementing trade on two markets (for the same currency pair) simultaneously, thereby allowing for tax havens. For the experiment we build on and extend the setup in [@bib0055]. In particular, we compare the impact of a Tobin tax under different market microstructures in laboratory markets: in Treatment OTC no market makers are present and thus each human trader can post limit and market orders. Hence, liquidity evolves endogenously through the actions of the human traders. In Treatment MM computerized market makers constantly post limit orders irrespective of the tax regime and thus keep liquidity provision constant.

We observe very strong and significant differences in the effects of a Tobin tax under different market microstructures: (i) in markets without market makers (Treatment OTC) an unilaterally imposed Tobin tax (i.e. a tax haven exists) increases volatility. (ii) In contrast, in markets with market makers (Treatment MM) an unilaterally imposed Tobin tax decreases volatility, while (iii) an encompassing Tobin tax has no impact on volatility in either setting. We do not find any significant differences in market efficiency across tax regimes, as all markets are fairly efficient.

The paper is organized as follows: In Section [2](#sec0010){ref-type="sec"} we present the market model and experimental design. Sections [3 and 4](#sec0040 sec0045){ref-type="sec"} report the econometric model and the results, respectively. Finally, Section [5](#sec0075){ref-type="sec"} concludes the paper by relating our results to previous studies and by discussing the practical implications of our results.

2. Experimental setup and procedure {#sec0010}
===================================

The setup of the experiment follows the one presented in [@bib0055], who explore the effects of a Tobin tax in one or both of two continuous double-auction markets. As a useful preliminary, we provide the following definitions. A *market* is a sequence of 10 trading periods for the currencies A and B. A *session* consists of 2 markets (LEFT and RIGHT), in which traders can act on both markets simultaneously.[10](#fn0050){ref-type="fn"} A *tax rate scenario* defines when and on which markets within a session a two-way Tobin tax is imposed (possibilities LEFT, LEFT and RIGHT, no tax on both markets). A *treatment* consists of 6 tax rate scenarios (with 2 sessions in Treatment OTC and 4 sessions in Treatment MM for each tax rate scenario). With all other things equal, Treatment OTC uses a double-auction market architecture, whereas Treatment MM is set up as a dealership market with computerized market makers posting limit orders.

2.1. Market setup {#sec0015}
-----------------

In each session a different cohort of 16 (Treatment OTC) or 8 (Treatment MM) human subjects trade currency A for currency B on two markets (denoted LEFT and RIGHT and placed accordingly on the screen; see screenshot in [Appendices A and B](#sec0085 sec0125){ref-type="sec"}). Both markets are displayed on the trading screen at the same time and traders can be active on both markets simultaneously. Buying a currency on one market and selling it on the other is possible, as is buying on both markets or selling on both markets.

The fundamental value of A (expressed in units of B) is modelled as a geometric Brownian motion without drift:$$\text{FV}_{k} = \text{FV}_{k - 1} \cdot e^{\gamma_{k}}\text{.}$$FV~*k*~ denotes the fundamental value in period *k* and *γ*~*k*~ is a normally distributed random variable with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 5%. FV~0~ is set to 60. We draw one fundamental value path randomly (path I) and its counterpart mirrored at the unconditional expected value of FV is used as path II. For each tax rate scenario in Treatment OTC (MM) two (four) sessions are run, one (two) with path I, the other with path II.

For the sake of simplicity we introduce a symmetric information structure where at the beginning of each period each subject receives a private signal (SIGNAL) on the fundamental value of currency A. This signal is calculated as the FV plus a noise term with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 2.5%. Estimation errors cancel out across subjects in each period to ensure that "the market" has an unbiased estimate of the FV.[11](#fn0055){ref-type="fn"}

In each session half of the subjects are initially endowed with 75 A and 1500 B. The other half starts with 25 A and 4500 B. Given an initial fundamental value FV~0~ of 60 B per A each trader\'s initial wealth is 6000 in currency B. The holdings in A and B are carried over from one period to the next and going short up to 100 (6000) units of currency A (B) is possible.[12](#fn0060){ref-type="fn"} Any order size and the partial execution of limit orders is possible as long as the endowments in A and B are above −100 and −6000, respectively. Order books are emptied, i.e. all orders deleted, before the beginning of a new period. To keep things simple there are no interest payments on holdings in either currency.

2.2. Tax rate scenarios {#sec0020}
-----------------------

The tax rate scenarios shown in [Table 1](#tbl0005){ref-type="table"} differ with respect to when and on which markets a (two-way) Tobin tax of 0.1% of the transaction value (price in B multiplied by units of A traded) is levied.

In particular, each session consists of two phases *p* of 5 periods each. Hence, the treatment abbreviations in [Table 1](#tbl0005){ref-type="table"} are to be read as follows: the numbers "0" and "2" specify whether no market ("0") or both markets ("2") are taxed in a given phase. If only one market is taxed, we chose to tax only the left market ("L") to reduce the number of possible scenarios. In this case the right market is always the tax haven.[13](#fn0065){ref-type="fn"}

Before the beginning of the first and the sixth period subjects are informed about the imposition of a tax with an announcement screen. This screen outlines in detail which markets are taxed and provides a calculation example for taxation. Subjects do not get any information about the potential implementation of transaction taxes before the main experiment starts and they are not informed whether and when the tax regime is changed again. Furthermore, the tax rate is also placed on the trading screen once a tax has been introduced.[14](#fn0070){ref-type="fn"}

2.3. Experimental treatments {#sec0025}
----------------------------

We ran 12 (24) sessions with 16 human (8 human subjects and 2 computerized agents) traders each in Treatment OTC (MM).[15](#fn0075){ref-type="fn"} The main experiment lasted 10 periods of 4 min each.[16](#fn0080){ref-type="fn"} To avoid strategic behavior towards the end of the experiment, subjects were told that the experiment will end between periods 8 and 14 with equal probability. At the end of the experiment all units of A were bought back at the fundamental value of the last period. Therefore, the final wealth comprised the value of the holdings in A (units of A multiplied by the fundamental value of the last period) plus the holdings in B and is converted into EUR at an exchange rate of 1 EUR = 400 Taler. All these were public knowledge. All 384 subjects were business students at the University of X, recruited with ORSEE ([@bib0045]).[17](#fn0085){ref-type="fn"} Sessions were computerized (using zTree 3.2.8 by [@bib0030]) and lasted about 90 min.

### 2.3.1. Treatment 1: over-the-counter -- OTC {#sec0030}

Subjects trade in a continuous double auction market and are able to post limit and market orders. Limit orders are executed according to price and then time priority.[18](#fn0090){ref-type="fn"} Market orders have priority over limit orders and are always executed instantaneously.[19](#fn0095){ref-type="fn"} The order books are open which means that all limit orders are immediately visible to all subjects.

### 2.3.2. Treatment 2: market maker -- MM {#sec0035}

Treatment MM deviates from Treatment OTC in one crucial aspect: subjects are not able to post limit orders, as those are provided by market makers. To achieve a constant liquidity inflow we implement one computerized market maker in each market (similar to [@bib0100]).[20](#fn0100){ref-type="fn"} Every several seconds (see process and parameters below) a market maker places both a bid and an ask at the same time *t*:$$\begin{array}{l}
\left. \text{BID}_{k,t} = P_{k,t} - \middle| \varepsilon_{k,t} \middle| + \delta_{k,t}, \right. \\
\left. \text{ASK}_{k,t} = P_{k,t} + \middle| \varepsilon_{k,t} \middle| + \delta_{k,t}. \right. \\
\end{array}$$Here *P*~*k*,*t*~ denotes the last transaction price at time *t* in period *k* and \|*ɛ*~*k*,*t*~\| is the absolute value of a standard normally distributed random variable. Hence, the bids and asks of a market maker mostly dependent on the last transaction price, since he places a bid and an ask with a spread of 2\|*ɛ*~*k*,*t*~\| with the same *ɛ*~*k*,*t*~ on each side of the current market price. Thus, if prices go up (through excess demand of the experimental subjects), market makers quickly incorporate this in their bids and asks. Note that they process no fundamental information. Market efficiency will thus be determined solely by the actions of human subjects. Market makers have no constraints on how many units of A and B they can hold, but in real markets they usually try to keep their long- and short-positions balanced, i.e. have a net exposure of zero. We therefore add a parameter *δ*~*k*,*t*~ to ensure that the market maker has a tendency to keep his net holdings in A close to his initial endowment *A*~0~ of zero. *δ*~*k*,*t*~ is calculated as (*A*~*k*,*t*~ − *A*~0~)/(\|*A*~*k*,*t*~ − *A*~0~\|) · (− \|*A*~*k*,*t*~ − *A*~0~\|)/100 which reduces to −*A*~*k*,*t*~/100 with *A*~*k*,*t*~ (*A*~0~) denoting the holdings in currency A at time *t* of period *k* (at the beginning of the experiment). If, for example, his holdings in A are 20 units below the initial holdings *A*~0~, he adds 0.2 to the bid and the ask to make his bids more attractive for subjects to accept and to sell. Consequently, the further away the current holdings in A are from the initial holdings the more aggressively a market maker tries to bring his holdings in A back to a net position of zero.

In order to mimic the order flow generated in market phases with both markets being untaxed in Treatment OTC, 90% of the generated limit orders are posted between 1 and 23 s after the previous order was posted (with a mean of 7.2 s). The distribution of this stochastic "waiting time" is drawn from a Weibull-distribution.[21](#fn0105){ref-type="fn"} For the quantity posted with each limit order a Poisson-distribution with a mean of 4.5 units of A fits the distribution in Treatment OTC best. Parameter *λ* is half the average limit order size in all periods with tax regime "0" in Treatment OTC.[22](#fn0110){ref-type="fn"}

Thus, the eight human traders in each session of Treatment MM are provided with a limit order flow very similar to untaxed markets in Treatment OTC. While the order flow (liquidity) by humans in Treatment OTC is likely to change after the introduction of a tax, this is not the case in Treatment MM, where the order flow is independent of the tax regime applied. This offers the advantage that we can measure the impact of a transaction tax on trader behavior when liquidity provision is held constant. However, it also means that some results need to be interpreted with caution, as in real markets market makers may change their order flow as a reaction to the tax.[23](#fn0115){ref-type="fn"}

3. Definition of variables and econometric model {#sec0040}
================================================

We use the following panel regression model:$$y_{m,p} = \alpha + \beta_{1}\text{TT}\_\text{encompassing}_{m,p} + \beta_{2}\text{TT}\_\text{unilateral}_{m,p} + \beta_{3}\text{Tax}\_\text{haven}_{m,p} + \varepsilon_{m,p}\text{.}$$Here, *y*~*m*,*p*~ is a generic placeholder for the dependent variables explained below, *m* indicates cross-section (market) and *p* phase (i.e. five consecutive periods in which a certain tax regime was applied). TT_encompassing equals 1 when both markets are taxed, zero otherwise. TT_unilateral is a binary dummy to define unilaterally taxed markets with the other market being taxed and Tax_haven is a binary dummy for the tax haven. Consequently, intercept *α* represents the tax regime in which both markets are untaxed. Importantly, we apply clustered standard errors on a session level to allow for correlation within sessions and independence of observations between sessions. In particular, we implement the "vce(cluster *varname*)" method in STATA in all panel regressions in this paper.

[Table 2](#tbl0010){ref-type="table"} provides formulae for the dependent variables used in this paper: normalized trading volume, normalized returns, acceptance ratio (measure for trading behavior), relative absolute deviation (measure for market efficiency) and normalized tax revenues. We normalize trading volume (*VOL*^*NORM*^) by the mean and the standard deviation of trading volume in each session *s* to avoid idiosyncratic impacts of individual sessions, since trading volumes differ by a factor of more than three between sessions.[24](#fn0120){ref-type="fn"} As one can see from [Table 2](#tbl0010){ref-type="table"} the respective means and standard deviations are calculated from period data. To arrive at normalized volume of phase *p* of market *m* the average of the respective five period values is calculated. A similar approach is applied for the volatility measure, standard deviation of normalized returns (*SDRET*^*NORM*^). Log-returns, *RET*~*s*,*m*,*i*~, with *i* denoting transaction, are normalized by the mean and the standard deviation in each session (see the discussion in [@bib0105] on the importance of normalizing returns from different observations). The standard deviation of these normalized returns in each market phase serves as dependent variable. Hence, independent observations with differences in the absolute level of volatility are easily comparable. *ACCRATIO* is calculated as the number of market orders divided by the number of limit orders. This variable is a proxy for the cautiousness of traders to accept limit orders, since low values hint at a very careful execution of market orders and a trend towards limit orders to gain the bid-ask spread. This behavior is especially expected in taxed markets, since the tax adds to the bid-ask spread as additional transaction costs. Note that *ACCRATIO* can be higher than 1 in cases where many small market orders are placed and thus partial execution of limit orders happens quite frequently. Beside tax revenues (*TAXREV*^*NORM*^) where we normalize the tax revenues (in currency B) by the mean and the standard deviation of tax revenues in each session, relative absolute deviation (*RAD*) completes the set of variables. It serves as measure for mispricing and is the absolute difference between mean prices per period and the respective FVs, benchmarked at the average FV in the market (see [@bib0125]). Hence, the higher *RAD*, the stronger is mispricing and the lower is market efficiency. For the variables *VOL*^*NORM*^, *ACCRATIO*, *TAXREV*^*NORM*^, and *RAD* period values are calculated first and the mean per phase *p* and market *m* is used in the regression.

4. Results {#sec0045}
==========

We observe very active trading in our markets, with an average of 764 transactions per session in Treatment OTC and 812 in Treatment MM. This is on average roughly one transaction every 3 s. Average trading volume per session is 1712 units of A in Treatment OTC, and 1314 in Treatment MM, which means that each unit of A is turned over 2.1 (3.3) times in OTC (MM). [Fig. 1](#fig0005){ref-type="fig"} presents the respective averages of normalized trading volume, volatility, acceptance ratio and market efficiency. The left four bars of each panel show data for Treatment OTC, the right four bars Treatment MM.

The first panel on the top left presents data on normalized trading volume *VOL*^*NORM*^. Here one observes that trading volume increases markedly in both treatments in the Tax havens (second bar) and falls even more in the unilaterally taxed markets (third bar). When an encompassing Tobin tax is implemented, trading volume decreases, but not dramatically (fourth bar). The effects seem to be stronger in Treatment OTC than in MM.

The level of volatility, measured by the standard deviation of normalized returns, is presented in the top right panel. While volatility is unchanged in both treatments when both markets are untaxed (first bar) compared to both being taxed (fourth bar), the unilateral introduction of a Tobin tax strongly increases volatility in Treatment OTC, but markedly decreases it in Treatment MM (third bar). The opposite holds for the Tax haven (second bar), where volatility decreases slightly in OTC, but increases in MM.

The bottom left panel presents data on the acceptance ratio. Here we see similar patterns (highest ratios when there is no tax and in the Tax haven, markedly lower ratios in single- or double-taxed markets), but at different levels: the acceptance ratio in Treatment MM is only roughly half the number in Treatment OTC. This is due to the fact that the computerized market makers in MM always post a bid and an ask simultaneously (with on average half the volume of the human traders in OTC), thus there are roughly two times as many orders in this treatment than in OTC.

Market efficiency, measured by *RAD* and shown in the bottom right panel, does not vary much across treatments and tax regimes. With values between 4.0 and 6.5 percent average deviation from the respective fundamental values, efficiency was quite high in all tax regimes.

Short selling, while allowed up to 100 percent of the initial total endowment (A and B combined), is not excessively used. Overall only 10.4 percent of subjects have short-positions in Treatment MM at the end of a period, while the number is higher at 19.2 percent in OTC. In both treatments short positions in currency A are more common than in currency B. For those subjects which hold short positions at the end of a period, the position is on average −2150 in B (up to −6000 possible) and −29 in A (−100 possible). Thus, the possibility to go short is used in only one-tenth to one-fifth of cases, and when it is used on average one third of the possible maximum is used. On average only 3--6 percent of the initial holdings were shorted.

After these descriptive statistics we now turn to the detailed econometric analysis provided in [Tables 3 and 4](#tbl0015 tbl0020){ref-type="table"}. In the former table results of the panel regression according to Eq. [(4)](#eq0015){ref-type="disp-formula"} are shown, while the latter provides results of a pairwise Mann--Whitney *U*-test which serves as a non-parametric robustness check.

4.1. Trading volume and liquidity {#sec0050}
---------------------------------

Focussing on normalized trading volume (*VOL*^*NORM*^) in [Table 3](#tbl0015){ref-type="table"}, we find that trading volume drops, though not significantly, when a tax is introduced in both markets (TT_encompassing) compared to double-untaxed markets (intercept *α*) in both treatments. This is in line with [@bib0055], where the tax rate is five times as high in most of their treatments. Also comparable to [@bib0055], when the tax is introduced in only one market (TT_unilateral), the drop is highly significant in both treatments, while trading volume in the untaxed market (Tax_haven) increases significantly in both treatments (with the effect being stronger in OTC).

Turning to differences between the two treatments one can see that most effects of an unilateral imposition of a Tobin tax are weaker in MM than in OTC. Thus, the market microstructure clearly has an influence on the effects a Tobin tax has on markets. The main reason is that the constant order flow in MM ensures enough liquidity in the form of limit orders to facilitate trade. Due to the design, there are no significant differences in the number of limit orders across tax regimes in Treatment MM. In Treatment OTC, however, liquidity varies significantly across tax regimes, with an average of 190 and 195 limit orders per phase and market when both markets are untaxed and both markets are taxed (TT_encompassing), respectively. Only 92 limit orders are posted in unilaterally taxed markets (TT_unilateral) in each phase on average, as liquidity moves to the tax haven, where we observe an average of 267 limit orders per phase.[25](#fn0125){ref-type="fn"}

4.2. Volatility {#sec0055}
---------------

One of the most important, but also most evasive and controversial issues surrounding the Tobin tax is the development of volatility in taxed markets. The first -- rather surprising -- result is that volatility is not significantly affected by an encompassing Tobin tax in both treatments. We attribute this to the relatively small changes the tax triggers in trading volume and order flow in both treatments.

However, when the tax is introduced in only one market we observe that the standard deviation of normalized returns (*SDRET*^*NORM*^) develops differently in the two microstructures: volatility *increases* significantly in unilaterally taxed markets (TT_unilateral) in Treatment OTC, but *decreases* significantly in the respective markets in Treatment MM compared to double-untaxed markets. The former runs counter, the latter is in line with the hypothesis of Tobin. This result merits a deeper analysis. As we find it is mainly a consequence of order flow, i.e. limit orders posted in the market. In MM the order flow is unaffected by the tax, i.e. the computerized market makers post as many limit orders as before. However, as human subjects in tax regime TT_unilateral submit fewer market orders (see development of trading volume), orderbooks become very liquid (large number of limit orders in the order book), and as a consequence the price impact of market orders and thus volatility decrease. By contrast, in Treatment OTC human subjects submit fewer limit orders in the unilaterally taxed market (92 limit orders per phase compared to 190 when both markets are untaxed) and a large share of liquidity shifts to the untaxed market (where on average 267 limit orders are posted), with the result of unilaterally taxed markets becoming relatively illiquid. Trading volume and the number of market orders posted decrease as well and thus the few transactions that are carried out have a stronger price impact and lead to comparatively high volatility in unilaterally taxed markets. One last finding we want to mention: volatility increases in the tax haven in Treatment MM due to the strong shift of trading activities to this market in combination with constant liquidity.

4.3. Trading behavior {#sec0060}
---------------------

*ACCRATIO* is the number of market orders divided by the number of limit orders which serves as a proxy for the cautiousness of subjects to accept posted limit orders. In Treatment MM this ratio is driven solely by the number of market orders placed by subjects, as liquidity provision is kept constant on both markets. As subjects mainly trade on the tax haven (Tax_haven), *ACCRATIO* in the unilaterally taxed market decreases significantly compared to when both markets are untaxed.

By contrast, in Treatment OTC also the limit order flow is affected by a tax. In taxed markets subjects are more cautious and so accept fewer limit orders. Hence, *ACCRATIO* decreases in markets with an unilateral tax (TT_unilateral), while it increases in the Tax haven (Tax_haven).

4.4. Market efficiency {#sec0065}
----------------------

Turning to market efficiency, which we measure by relative absolute deviation (*RAD*), we find that it is not significantly affected by a Tobin tax in any of the treatments. This result from the regression of [Table 4](#tbl0020){ref-type="table"} is supported by pairwise Mann--Whitney *U*-tests (see [Table 4](#tbl0020){ref-type="table"}) which all deliver *p*-values above 0.20. This result differs from [@bib0055], who find lower efficiency in an unilaterally taxed market. We attribute this to the high level of efficiency we observe throughout the experiment. With average *RAD*s of 5.8 and 4.8 percent in OTC and MM, respectively, the deviations from the fundamental values are never very large.

4.5. Tax revenues {#sec0070}
-----------------

The development of tax revenues (*TAXREV*^*NORM*^) mainly depends on the development of trading volume. As trading volume reduction is stronger in unilaterally taxed markets of Treatment OTC, the negative effect on tax revenues there is nearly two times stronger than in Treatment MM (compared to hypothetical tax revenues in periods where both markets are untaxed). Looking at non-normalized data we find that tax revenues are more than 40% higher in unilaterally taxed markets in Treatment MM than in Treatment OTC. Only when an encompassing Tobin tax is imposed (TT_encompassing) tax revenues are substantial.

5. Conclusion and discussion {#sec0075}
============================

We examined the effect the introduction of a Tobin tax had in laboratory markets which were set up either as OTC-markets or as dealership markets where computerized market makers (MM) provided limit orders and thus liquidity provision irrespective of the tax regime applied. The main findings of the paper are on the controversial issue of volatility: (i) in markets without market makers an unilaterally imposed Tobin tax increased volatility. (ii) In contrast, in markets with market makers an unilaterally imposed Tobin tax decreased volatility, while (iii) an encompassing Tobin tax had no impact on volatility in either setting. In particular, the mechanisms of the results were mainly due to different flows of liquidity in both treatments: in markets of Treatment OTC an unilaterally introduced Tobin tax decreased trading volume and the number of limit orders significantly, leading to lower orderbook liquidity, an increased price impact of market orders and thus higher volatility. By contrast, in unilaterally taxed markets in Treatment MM subjects traded less as well. In combination with the constant order flow provided by the computerized market makers, this lead to highly liquid orderbooks, a decrease in the price impact of market orders and thus lower volatility. At the same time volatility increased in the tax haven due to increased trading activity in combination with a constant level of liquidity provision. Trading volume decreased much less than in markets with an unilateral Tobin tax and hence tax revenues were substantial.

Thus, from the perspective of volatility, Treatment OTC stands in contrast to the hypothesis of Tobin and supports most empirical studies on transaction taxes (e.g. [@bib0005; @bib0050; @bib0065]). Instead, Treatment MM is in line with Tobin\'s conjectures and supports many agent-based studies on transaction taxes (e.g. [@bib0035; @bib0155; @bib0020; @bib0160]). We also report similar, mostly even more pronounced effects compared to [@bib0100]. The most likely reason for the less pronounced results in their double-auction setting is that they do not allow for tax avoidance by implementing only one market. As agents cannot shift volume to another market, their "liquidity effect" is probably weaker and hence volatility remains almost unaffected. Thus, following the results of [@bib0100] and our findings, future research on the Tobin tax should take into account the strong impact of market microstructure, especially for volatility.

When trying to relate our results to real FX markets, we have to acknowledge the limitations of our laboratory markets, as especially Treatment MM was set up with very basic computerized market makers. Also, as with any experimental study, the size of the data-set is limited and we have to keep in mind that we operate in stylized markets. However, if even such simple markets where few subjects with comparatively low incentives trade deliver strong and robust results (e.g. strong tax avoidance, increased volatility in humans-only-markets), we are confident that these results translate well to larger markets where the stakes are much higher and subjects thus more eager to find "optimal" responses to tax regime changes. Thus, we think the results are clear and robust enough to state that (i) markets with market makers (MM) could lead to the desired outcome of Tobin (i.e. lower volatility as high-frequency traders trade less than before) when it can be assured that liquidity provision is hardly affected by the tax. This finding is remarkable as it would be beneficial for governments to impose a Tobin tax on such markets even without international coordination, since an unilateral imposition lowers volatility without affecting efficiency. Furthermore, (ii) no matter which microstructure is applied, an encompassing Tobin tax would not increase volatility or affect efficiency and would raise substantial tax revenues if introduced on all major markets.

Appendix A. Instruction for Treatment OTC {#sec0085}
=========================================

Background of the experiment {#sec0090}
----------------------------

In this experiment on currency trading 16 traders can trade currency A and currency B (B is the home currency) in two independent markets (called LEFT and RIGHT).

Market properties {#sec0095}
-----------------

•Initial endowment: Half of the traders start with 75 units A and 1500 units B, while the other half of the traders start with 25 units A and 4500 units B.•There are two markets where the currencies can be traded -- markets LEFT and RIGHT.•No interest is paid on any currency.•The prices in the two markets can deviate.

Fundamental value of currency A {#sec0100}
-------------------------------

The fundamentally justified value -- fundamental value need not equal the price -- of currency A (expressed in units of currency B) is the value that would result from a full and fair analysis of the currency. In reality it depends on micro- and macroeconomic variables. In our market the fundamental value of A (expressed in units of B) is modelled as a stochastic process:$$\text{FV}_{k} = \text{FV}_{k - 1} \cdot e^{\gamma_{k}}\text{.}$$where FV~*k*~ stands for the fundamental value in period *k* and *γ*~*k*~ is a normally distributed random variable with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 5%. The fundamental value in the current period it thus the best estimate of the fundamental value in the next period.

Information on the fundamental value of currency A {#sec0105}
--------------------------------------------------

Each period each subject receives a private signal (SIGNAL) on the fundamental value of currency A (expressed in units of currency B). This signal can be above or below the actual fundamental value with equal probability. Most signals are close to the true fundamental value, as only an error term with an expected value of zero and a standard deviation of 2.5% is added to the fundamental value.

Calculating total wealth {#sec0110}
------------------------

Your total wealth (expressed in units of B) comprised the value of your holdings in A (units of A multiplied by the last price) plus the holdings of B. For valuing A the last price is used.$$\text{Wealth} = (\text{units\ A} \times \text{price\ A}) + \text{units\ B}$$

If prices in the two markets deviate, the current price with the higher trading volume is used.

Important details {#sec0115}
-----------------

•Each trading period lasts 240 s, i.e. 4 min.•The experiment lasts between 8 and 14 periods with equal termination probability in each period.•Your payment in Euro depends on your total wealth at the end of the experiment. Your holdings of A will be valued at their fundamental value (not price!) of the last period. The final payment is calculated as follows:$$\text{Final\ wealth} = (\text{units\ A} \times \text{fundamental\ value}) + \text{units\ B}$$$$\text{Payment} = \frac{\text{Final\ wealth}}{400}$$

Example: units A: 30, fundamental value of A: 70, units B: 3900.$$\text{Final\ wealth} = (30 \times 70) + 3900 = 6000$$$$\text{Payment} = \frac{6000}{400} = 15\,\text{Euro}$$

The trading screen looks as follows:![](fx1.gif)

Trading {#sec0120}
-------

•All subjects can buy and sell currencies at any time. This can be done on the LEFT or RIGHT market -- switching between markets is free and causes no extra costs. Short selling (negative holdings) is possible up to an amount of −100 A and −6.000 B. The volume of each transaction is limited to 20 units of A, but trading volume within a period is unlimited.•Each period subjects can enter as many BIDs and ASKs (between 1 and 99) as they want -- again without restrictions on the LEFT and RIGHT market.•IMPORTANT: The price of the currencies is set exclusively by you and the other subjects in the market by supply and demand.

After each trading period a history screen is shown for 10 s to provide you with information on what happened in the market:![](fx2.gif)

Appendix B. Instruction for Treatment MM {#sec0125}
========================================

Background of the experiment {#sec0130}
----------------------------

In this experiment on currency trading 8 human traders and 2 computerized market makers can trade currency A and currency B (B is the home currency) in two independent markets (called LEFT and RIGHT).

Market properties {#sec0135}
-----------------

•Initial endowment: Half of the human traders start with 75 units A and 1500 units B, while the other half of the human traders start with 25 units A and 4500 units B.•There are two markets where the currencies can be traded -- markets LEFT and RIGHT.•On every market, one computerized market maker quotes sell and buy offers to which the currency A can be bought or sold.•No interest is paid on any currency.•The prices in the two markets can deviate.

Fundamental value of currency A {#sec0140}
-------------------------------

The fundamentally justified value -- fundamental value need not equal the price -- of currency A (expressed in units of currency B) is the value that would result from a full and fair analysis of the currency. In reality it depends on micro- and macroeconomic variables. In our market the fundamental value of A (expressed in units of B) is modelled as a stochastic process:$$\text{FV}_{k} = \text{FV}_{k - 1} \cdot e^{\gamma_{k}}\text{.}$$where FV~*k*~ stands for the fundamental value in period *k* and *γ*~*k*~ is a normally distributed random variable with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 5%. The fundamental value in the current period it thus the best estimate of the fundamental value in the next period.

Information on the fundamental value of currency A {#sec0145}
--------------------------------------------------

Each period each subject receives a private signal (SIGNAL) on the fundamental value of currency A (expressed in units of currency B). This signal can be above or below the actual fundamental value with equal probability. Most signals are close to the true fundamental value, as only an error term with an expected value of zero and a standard deviation of 2.5% is added to the fundamental value.

Calculating total wealth {#sec0150}
------------------------

Your total wealth (expressed in units of B) is comprised of the value of your holdings in A (units of A multiplied by the last price) plus the holdings of B. For valuing A the last price is used.$$\text{Wealth} = (\text{units\ A} \times \text{price\ A}) + \text{units\ B}$$

If prices in the two markets deviate, the current price with the higher trading volume is used.

Important details {#sec0155}
-----------------

•Each trading period lasts 240 s, i.e. 4 min.•The experiment lasts between 8 and 14 periods with equal termination probability in each period.•Your payment in Euro depends on your total wealth at the end of the experiment. Your holdings of A will be valued at their fundamental value (not price!) of the last period. The final payment is calculated as follows:$$\text{Final\ wealth} = (\text{units\ A} \times \text{fundamental\ value}) + \text{units\ B}$$$$\text{Payment} = \frac{\text{Final\ wealth}}{400}$$

Example: units A: 30, fundamental value of A: 70, units B: 3900.$$\text{Final\ wealth} = (30 \times 70) + 3900 = 6000$$$$\text{Payment} = \frac{6000}{400} = 15\,\text{Euro}$$

The trading screen looks as follows:![](fx3.gif)

Trading {#sec0160}
-------

•All subjects can buy and sell currencies at any time. This can be done on the LEFT or RIGHT market -- switching between markets is free and causes no extra costs. Short selling (negative holdings) is possible up to an amount of −100 A and −6.000 B. The volume of each transaction is limited to 20 units of A, but trading volume within a period is unlimited.•The BIDs and ASKs are set exclusively by the 2 computerized market makers, who are completely independent from each other. Each computerized market maker quotes on average every 6 s a sell and buy offer simultaneously, whereas he orientates his quotes on the last trading price.•IMPORTANT: The price of the currencies is set exclusively by you and the other subjects in the market by supply and demand.

After each trading period a history screen is shown for 10 s to provide you with information on what has happened in the market:![](fx4.gif)
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[@bib0040] report an annual increase of 17% in the daily trading volume on world FX markets from 1973 until 2005.

For various aspects of the Tobin tax see [@bib0060], [@bib0120] and [@bib0050].

See e.g. [@bib0130], [@bib0140], [@bib0115], [@bib0075], [@bib0135], [@bib0015] and [@bib0010].

For example, volume fell by one-third after a stamp tax of 0.1 percent was increased to 0.3 percent on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in May 2007. In Sweden the introduction of a transaction tax of 0.5% in 1984 led to the markets for futures and for bills to dry up almost completely and more than half of share trading to move abroad, mostly to London ([@bib0150]).

See [@bib0085], [@bib0090] and [@bib0070] for studies with the chartist/fundamentalist approach (in the spirit of Tobin\'s distinction between speculators and fundamentalists). Already [@bib0035] speculates that a transaction tax could increase the number of long-term fundamentalists or decrease the number of speculators. Either way, the price variability should decrease. More recent contributions by [@bib0155], [@bib0020] and [@bib0160] provide further evidence that a Tobin tax drives chartists from the market and stabilizes prices. Instead, with a different agent-based modelling approach, [@bib0095] include a group of random traders and contrarians in addition to fundamentalists and chartists and find a positive (negative) impact of a Tobin tax on volatility (trading volume).

See e.g. [@bib0005], [@bib0050] and [@bib0065].

At the CME and the LIFFE some currency pairs in their future markets are traded with market makers. In general, the importance of market makers has slightly decreased during the last years.

In this market microstructure big institutional investors (e.g., banks, large companies) trade currencies directly with each other without market makers. The biggest electronic trading platforms are EBS and Reuters 3000 XTRA.

A negative relationship of market liquidity and the price impact of orders has already been claimed by [@bib0020], [@bib0080] and [@bib0095]. [@bib0020] and [@bib0095] further argue that transaction taxes probably have a negative impact on market liquidity, hinting at increased volatility when liquidity drops, since the price impact of orders increases.

We consciously chose generic currencies and places to avoid possible influences due to preferences of subjects.

This was implemented by drawing positive estimation errors for half of the subjects and using the respective negative error terms for the other half of subjects.

Theoretically this would allow bankruptcy of a subject. However, with the limit on short selling this would require a subject to take the maximum loan, buy the asset at very high prices, followed by a price drop by one half. This did never occur and no subject came close to bankruptcy.

For instance, in tax rate scenario L2 the tax is introduced only on market LEFT in the first five periods and is levied also on the RIGHT market in periods 6--10. [@bib0055] already provide evidence on the impact of a tax on the LEFT and on the RIGHT market.

Our treatments are balanced in the following way: with two market phases (periods 1--5 and 6--10) and three tax regimes, we achieve a perfectly randomized structure, since we can implement all possible permutations of "0", "2", and "L". Hence, these three tax regimes show up equally often in the first and in the second half within all sessions of a treatment. This offers the big advantage that possible time trends in the data due to learning effects play hardly any role.

As subjects did not have to post limit orders in MM, we reduced the number of human traders to 8 to achieve better comparability to Treatment OTC. It turned out that trading volumes were very similar across the two treatments. To have the same number of humans in each treatment we doubled the number of sessions we ran for MM.

Before trading started subjects had 15 min to read written instructions. Questions were answered privately. Then the trading screen was explained and two trial periods (not relevant for the payout) were conducted to allow subjects to become familiar with the trading screen and the trading procedure (see [Appendices A and B](#sec0085 sec0125){ref-type="sec"} for the trading screen and the experimental instructions).

Given their curriculum they know about standard deviations and stochastic processes which were used to model the FV.

Traders have to specify price and quantity they want to trade for with the risk that the limit order will not be accepted by another trader.

Traders only have to specify the quantity they want to trade for with immediate execution at the price of the best limit order in the market.

We chose computerized market makers rather than human market makers as the former guarantee a constant flow of liquidity to the market.

We apply a Weibull-distribution, since this distribution best fits empirically observed waiting times between consecutive limit orders and trades ([@bib0025; @bib0110]). In particular,$$WTLO = \lambda{( - \ln(X))}^{1/c}$$

provides us with a weibullian-distributed random variable with *X* being a uniformly distributed random variable in the range zero to one, *λ* standing for the scale parameter (the average of waiting times in all periods with a tax regime of "0" in Treatment OTC), and *c* indicating the shape parameter of the distribution. *λ* is set to 6.0 and *c* is approximated with 0.87, which is very close to the empirically observed shape parameter in [@bib0110].

As market makers post a bid and an ask simultaneously, the quantity posted with each limit order of the market makers has to be half the quantity compared to OTC.

We searched for empirical papers on reactions to tax changes by real-world market makers, but were not able to find any. Here is clearly potential for future research.

With an average trading volume of 1712 units of A in OTC the standard deviation is 1021, and thus very high, which necessitates the normalization to ensure an equal weight/impact of each session in the aggregate data.

We apply a panel regression according to Eq. [(4)](#eq0015){ref-type="disp-formula"} with the number of limit orders being the dependent variable. The increase (decrease) in tax regime Tax_haven (TT_unilateral) is significant on the 1%-level.

![Descriptive statistics. Averages per phase of the dependent variables conditional on treatment and tax regime. *VOL*^*NORM*^ (normalized trading volume), *SDRETNORM* (standard deviation of normalized returns), *ACCRATIO* (acceptance ratio -- market orders divided by limit orders) and *RAD* (relative absolute deviation of prices compared to fundamentals). *no*\_*Tax*: both markets untaxed, *Tax*\_*hav*: this market untaxed, but other market taxed, *TT*\_*uni*: this market taxed, but other market untaxed, *TT*\_*enc*: both markets taxed.](gr1){#fig0005}

###### 

Tax rate scenarios in each treatment.

  Tax rate scenario   Periods 1--5   Periods 6--10          
  ------------------- -------------- --------------- ------ ------
  0L                  --             --              0.1%   --
  02                  --             --              0.1%   0.1%
  L0                  0.1%           --              --     --
  L2                  0.1%           --              0.1%   0.1%
  20                  0.1%           0.1%            --     --
  2L                  0.1%           0.1%            0.1%   --

Entries show the two-way tax rate (0.1% for each side) for taxed markets. Dashes indicate the absence of taxes. In Treatment OTC (MM) two (four) sessions are run for each tax rate scenario.

###### 

Formulae for the calculation of variables.

  Measure                                                           Calculation
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Normalized trading volume                                         $VOL_{s,m,k}^{NORM} = (VOL_{s,m,k} - \overline{VOL_{s}})/\sigma_{s}^{VOL}$
  Normalized returns (tick data)                                    $RET_{s,m,i}^{NORM} = (RET_{s,m,i} - \overline{RET_{s}})/\sigma_{s}^{RET}$
  Acceptance ratio                                                  *ACCRATIO*~*s*,*m*,*k*~ = *MO*~*s*,*m*,*k*~/*LO*~*s*,*m*,*k*~
  Relative absolute deviation[a](#tblfn0005){ref-type="table-fn"}   $RAD_{s,m,k} = \left| {\overline{P_{s,m,k}} - FV_{s,m,k}} \right|/\overline{\left| {FV_{s}} \right|}$
  Normalized tax revenues                                           $TAXREV_{s,m,k}^{NORM} = (TAXREV_{s,m,k} - \overline{TAXREV_{s}})/\sigma_{s}^{TAXREV}$

*s*, session; *m*, market; *k*, period; *i*, trades.

*VOL*~*s*,*m*,*k*~ = units of currency A traded in period *k*; $\overline{VOL_{s}} = \text{average\ trading\ volume\ per\ period\ of\ currency\ A\ in\ session}\, s$; $\sigma_{s}^{VOL} = \text{standard\ deviation\ of\ all\ trading\ volumes\ per\ period\ of\ currency\ A\ in\ session}\, s$; *RET*~*s*,*m*,*i*~ = ln(*P*~*s*,*m*,*i*~) − ln(*P*~*s*,*m*,*i*−1~); *P*~*s*,*m*,*i*~ = trading price of trade *i*; $\overline{RET_{s}} = \text{average\ of\ all\ returns}\,(RET)\,\text{in\ session}\, s$; $\sigma_{s}^{RET} = \text{standard\ deviation\ of\ all\ returns}\,(RET)\,\text{in\ session}\, s$; *MO*~*s*,*m*,*k*~ = number of market orders; *LO*~*s*,*m*,*k*~ = number of limit orders. $\overline{P_{s,m,k}} = (\text{volume-weighted})\,\text{mean\ price}$; *FV*~*s*,*m*,*k*~ = fundamental value; $\overline{FV_{s}} = \text{average\ fundamental\ value\ of\ the\ session}$; *TAXREV*~*s*,*m*,*k*~ = tax revenues in currency B in period *k*; $\overline{TAXREV_{s}} = \text{average\ tax\ revenues\ per\ period\ in\ currency\ B\ in\ session}\, s$; $\sigma_{s}^{TAXREV} = \text{standard\ deviation\ of\ all\ tax\ revenues\ per\ period\ in\ currency\ B\ in\ session}\, s$;.

[@bib0125].

###### 

Panel regression for both treatments.

                    *VOL*^*NORM*^                                     *SDRET*^*NORM*^                                   *ACCRATIO*                                       *RAD*                                             *TAXREV*^*NORM*^                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
  ----------------- ------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------
  TT_encompassing   −0.257                                            −0.252                                            −0.078                                           −0.064                                            −0.129                                           −0.109[\*\*](#tblfn0015){ref-type="table-fn"}     −0.017                                           0.005                                            −0.329                                            −0.180
                    (−0.999)                                          (−1.326)                                          (−0.546)                                         (−0.771)                                          (−1.458)                                         (−2.036)                                          (−1.198)                                         (0.975)                                          (−1.120)                                          (−0.640)
  TT_unilateral     −1.227[\*\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.815[\*\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.561[\*\*](#tblfn0015){ref-type="table-fn"}     −0.357[\*\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.223[\*](#tblfn0010){ref-type="table-fn"}      −0.192[\*\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.008                                            0.013                                            −1.247[\*\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}   −1.106[\*\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}
                    (−6.109)                                          (−4.915)                                          (1.969)                                          (−4.240)                                          (−1.814)                                         (−3.717)                                          (0.571)                                          (1.494)                                          (−6.060)                                          (−5.040)
  Tax_haven         1.027[\*\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.334[\*](#tblfn0010){ref-type="table-fn"}        −0.111                                           0.247[\*\*](#tblfn0015){ref-type="table-fn"}      0.115[\*](#tblfn0010){ref-type="table-fn"}       0.049                                             −0.004                                           0.013                                                                                              
                    (4.746)                                           (1.754)                                           (−1.084)                                         (2.184)                                           (1.669)                                          (0.866)                                           (−0.400)                                         (1.375)                                                                                            
  *α*               0.119                                             0.164                                             0.987[\*\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.917[\*\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}    1.031[\*\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.598[\*\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.058[\*\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.048[\*\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.155                                             0.132
                    (0.800)                                           (1.525)                                           (15.982)                                         (14.616)                                          (10.176)                                         (10.921)                                          (3.219)                                          (10.522)                                         (0.950)                                           (0.860)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
  *N*               48                                                96                                                48                                               96                                                48                                               96                                                48                                               96                                               48                                                96

Dependent variables: *VOL*^*NORM*^ (normalized trading volume), *SDRET*^*NORM*^ (standard deviation of normalized returns), *ACCRATIO* (acceptance ratio -- market orders divided by limit orders), *RAD* (relative absolute deviation of prices compared to fundamentals), and *TAXREV*^*NORM*^ (normalized tax revenues). *z*-Values are given in parentheses. TT_encompassing: both markets taxed; TT_unilateral: this market taxed, but other market untaxed; Tax_haven: this market untaxed, but other market taxed.

10% significance level of a double-sided test.

5% significance level of a double-sided test.

1% significance level of a double-sided test.

###### 

Robustness checks for the dependent variables. Pairwise Mann--Whitney *U*-tests (*z*-values and *p*-values in parenthesis are provided).

  OTC               TT_unilateral                                    TT_encompassing                                   Tax_haven
  ----------------- ------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------
  *VOL*^*NORM*^                                                                                                        
  no_tax            3.797[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.319                                             −3.246[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                    (0.000)                                          (0.187)                                           (0.001)
  TT_unilateral                                                      −3.858[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}   −3.361[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                     (0.000)                                           (0.001)
  TT_encompassing                                                                                                      −3.552[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                                                                       (0.000)

  MM                TT_unilateral                                    TT_encompassing                                 Tax_haven
  ----------------- ------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------
  *VOL*^*NORM*^                                                                                                      
  no_tax            3.302[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.423                                           −0.186
                    (0.001)                                          (0.155)                                         (0.853)
  TT_unilateral                                                      −2.176[\*\*](#tblfn0030){ref-type="table-fn"}   −2.978[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                     (0.030)                                         (0.003)
  TT_encompassing                                                                                                    −1.345
                                                                                                                     (0.179)

  OTC               TT_unilateral                                   TT_encompassing                                Tax_haven
  ----------------- ----------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------
  *SDRET*^*NORM*^                                                                                                  
  no_tax            −2.205[\*\*](#tblfn0030){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.055                                          1.408
                    (0.028)                                         (0.291)                                        (0.159)
  TT_unilateral                                                     2.572[\*\*](#tblfn0030){ref-type="table-fn"}   2.415[\*\*](#tblfn0030){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                    (0.010)                                        (0.016)
  TT_encompassing                                                                                                  −0.367
                                                                                                                   (0.713)

  MM                TT_unilateral                                    TT_encompassing                                   Tax_haven
  ----------------- ------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------
  *SDRET*^*NORM*^                                                                                                      
  no_tax            3.674[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.047                                             −2.865[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                    (0.000)                                          (0.295)                                           (0.004)
  TT_unilateral                                                      −3.390[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}   −4.183[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                     (0.001)                                           (0.000)
  TT_encompassing                                                                                                      −3.630[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                                                                       (0.000)

  OTC               TT_unilateral                                TT_encompassing   Tax_haven
  ----------------- -------------------------------------------- ----------------- -------------------------------------------------
  *ACCRATIO*                                                                       
  no_tax            1.653[\*](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.394             −1.470
                    (0.098)                                      (0.163)           (0.142)
  TT_unilateral                                                  −0.551            −2.415[\*\*](#tblfn0030){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                 (0.582)           (0.016)
  TT_encompassing                                                                  −2.694[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                                   (0.007)

  MM                TT_unilateral                                    TT_encompassing   Tax_haven
  ----------------- ------------------------------------------------ ----------------- -------------------------------------------------
  *ACCRATIO*                                                                           
  no_tax            2.909[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.611             −0.634
                    (0.004)                                          (0.107)           (0.526)
  TT_unilateral                                                      −1.597            −2.902[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                     (0.110)           (0.004)
  TT_encompassing                                                                      −1.990[\*\*](#tblfn0030){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                                       (0.047)

  OTC               TT_unilateral   TT_encompassing   Tax_haven
  ----------------- --------------- ----------------- -----------
  *RAD*                                               
  no_tax            −0.674          0.339             −0.674
                    (0.500)         (0.735)           (0.500)
  TT_unilateral                     1.225             0.630
                                    (0.220)           (0.529)
  TT_encompassing                                     −1.041
                                                      (0.298)

  MM                TT_unilateral   TT_encompassing   Tax_haven
  ----------------- --------------- ----------------- -----------
  *RAD*                                               
  no_tax            −0.678          −1.370            −0.328
                    (0.498)         (0.171)           (0.743)
  TT_unilateral                     −0.525            0.0380
                                    (0.600)           (0.970)
  TT_encompassing                                     0.547
                                                      (0.585)

  OTC                TT_unilateral                                    TT_encompassing                                   Tax_haven
  ------------------ ------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------
  *TAXREV*^*NORM*^                                                                                                      
  no_tax             3.858[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.432                                             −2.756[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                     (0.000)                                          (0.152)                                           (0.006)
  TT_unilateral                                                       −3.429[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}   −3.361[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                      (0.001)                                           (0.001)
  TT_encompassing                                                                                                       −3.368[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                                                                        (0.001)

  MM                 TT_unilateral                                    TT_encompassing                                   Tax_haven
  ------------------ ------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------
  *TAXREV*^*NORM*^                                                                                                      
  no_tax             4.265[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.034                                             −2.843[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                     (0.000)                                          (0.301)                                           (0.005)
  TT_unilateral                                                       −4.112[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}   −4.598[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                      (0.000)                                           (0.000)
  TT_encompassing                                                                                                       −3.368[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                                                                        (0.001)

*VOL*^*NORM*^ (normalized trading volume), *SDRET*^*NORM*^ (standard deviation of normalized returns), *ACCRATIO* (acceptance ratio -- market orders divided by limit orders), *RAD* (relative absolute deviation of prices compared to fundamentals), and *TAXREV*^*NORM*^ (normalized tax revenues). no_tax: both markets untaxed; TT_encompassing: both markets taxed; TT_unilateral: this market taxed, but other market untaxed; Tax_haven: this market untaxed, but other market taxed.

10% significance level of a double-sided test.

5% significance level of a double-sided test.

1% significance level of a double-sided test.
